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Ryan Lang

Land: If You Don’t Use It, You Lose It:
Why Adverse Possession of Government Property is Necessary
Section I
Introduction
It is often believed that land owned by the government cannot be acquired
through adverse possession. This is a fallacy however because although government land
is typically immune from adverse possession vacant or underused land is not always
afforded sovereign immunity. This paper takes the point of view that it is not enough that
only land owned by municipalities are subject to adverse possession. All developed
governmental land should be subject to adverse possession.

Many argue that it is

important for a governmental entity to be immune from adverse possession due to how
much land it owns, how expensive it would be to monitor the land, and how it would
make it difficult for the government to buy land for the purpose of land speculation.
Allowing adverse possession of developed government property would force the
government to improve the maintenance of its property and lead to better utilization of
property across the nation. Furthermore, it is imperative that the United States protects
the scarce amount of wild and undeveloped land left in the nation through creating
stricter requirements to adversely possess undeveloped land.
The particular issue discussed in this paper is that the time has come to strip the
United States government and state governments of sovereign immunity from the adverse
possession of developed land while making it more difficult to adversely possess
undeveloped lands. The reason I chose to focus on the adverse possession of government
1

property as well as the need to protect wild and undeveloped lands is that there is unused
developed property that needs to be put back into circulation. There is a desire to utilize
the land efficiently and to make the most of property but this desire cannot be allowed to
come at the expense of the scarce amount of undeveloped land in this country.
This paper will address various topics regarding the adverse possession of
government property in the following order: Section II will discuss the background of
adverse possession, Section III will discuss why the government should not be immune
from adverse possession, Section IV will discuss the arguments supporting governmental
immunity from adverse possession with rebuttals to those arguments, and Section V will
discuss the need to protect and preserve the scarce amount of wild and undeveloped land
in the United States.
Section II
Adverse Possession
Adverse possession is a doctrine that allows trespassers to transform from
possessor to true owner of privately owned property if the owner fails to expel the
trespassers before the end of the statutory period usually before the statute of limitations.
In order to adversely possess the trespasser is required by the statute to use the property
as if it were its own for a specific amount of time. Once the required amount of time has
passed under the statute of limitations the doctrine of adverse possession prevents the
original owner from bringing lawsuits in an attempt to recover the land while also
creating a new title for the trespasser.
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The common law requires that the trespasser’s possession must be “actual, open,
continuous, notorious, exclusive, and under color or claim of right.” 1 Different state
statutes may require more from the adverse possessor, such as a requirement to have paid
all state and local property taxes during the period of trespassing, while others require the
land to be “protected by a substantial inclosure” or “cultivated or improved” in the usual
way.2 Of the universal elements of adverse possession, the first element requires that
there is actual possession of physical property and that the trespasser utilizes the land in a
way that a reasonable owner would. 3 The open and notorious element requires the
trespasser’s possession to be so blatant that it could be detected upon inspection of the
property and that upon inspection a reasonable owner would be aware of the trespassers
use of his land.4 The exclusive possession element requires that the trespasser have sole
possession of the land and not be the land with the titleholder or the general public;
however, this element is loosely enforced throughout courts.5 The fourth element is the
requirement that the possession be adverse, meaning that it must be under color or claim
of right; however, many courts require that the trespasser use the land and acts as if she
were the true owner without the permission of the title holder.6 The last element is that
the use by the adverse possessor must be continuous and without interruption throughout
the time set forth in the statute of limitations.7 A landowner is allowed to bring a claim

1

See Mackinac Island Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 504, 349 N.W.2d 191, 195
(Mich. App. 1984).
2
See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 541.02 (West 1998); Mont. Code Ann. S 70-19-411 (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. S 11.150 (Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-12-12 (1992); N.Y. Real Prop. Acts.
Law S 512, 522 (McKinney 1979).
3
See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 436 (2000).
4
See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 438.
5
Id. at 440.
6
Id. at 442; at 441-44.
7
Id. at 444-45.
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for ejectment, a civil action to recover the possession of or title to land, at any time until
the statute of limitations for adverse possession is exceeded.8 If a trespasser meets all of
the elements required for adverse possession, they obtain title in fee, which grants the
possessor title of the land from the rightful owner. After the statutory period runs and the
adverse possessor takes claim, the prior landowner is not allowed to bring claims for any
remedies.9
Adverse possession’s roots date all the way back to early Roman and Feudal
Law.10 The doctrine developed throughout England around 1275 to prevent the waste of
land granted to the people by the king. 11 The doctrine of adverse possession was
originally created to prevent costly legal disputes over property while forcing owners to
monitor their property and to utilize their property. 12 With adverse possession came
about sovereign immunity against adverse possession as a way of protecting the king,
who was too busy working for the benefit of his subjects to care for and protect his
land. 13 This sovereign immunity against the statutes of adverse possession is termed
“nullum tempus occurrit regi,” meaning “time does not run against the king.” 14 This
English doctrine was adopted by all states in America and was adopted by all states as a
way to cure title disputes it established a twenty-year statute of limitations before
adversely possessing the property.15 The desire to develop as much land as possible of

8

See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 438.
Id.
10
Id.
11
See Brian Gardiner, Comment, Squatters’ Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for
Equitable Application of Property Laws, 8 IND. INT’LL & COMP. L. REV. 119, 125-26 (1997).
12
Id. at 126-27.
13
See Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991).
14
See Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d at 202.
15
See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 437; Gardiner, supra note 11, at 129.
9
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land in America has since led to a decrease of the statute of limitations in many states to
as few as five years; however, some statutes of limitations have remained as long as forty
years. 16 Like England before it, the United States also adopted a version of “nullum
tempus occurrit regi” and adapted the sovereign immunity to apply to land of government
entities since our government does not have a king.17
There is not a uniformity of adverse possession laws in the United States; rather
each state has their own adverse possession laws. 18 The New Jersey court system
displayed the confusion and chaos of adverse possession laws across the nation.19 New
Jersey had been applying the adverse possession laws incorrectly for over fifty years.20
The court in J & M Land Co. v. First Nat. Bank held that New Jersey courts had been
incorrectly applying a twenty-year statute of limitations for the entry of a judgment for
adverse possession for the past fifty years.21 The pertinent statute in the New Jersey,
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-30 provided that:
Thirty years actual possession of any real estate excepting woodlands or
uncultivated tracts, and 60 years’ actual possession of woodlands or
uncultivated tracts, uninterruptedly continued by occupancy, descent,
conveyance, or otherwise, shall, in whatever way or manner such
possession might have commenced or have been continued, vest a full and
complete right and title in every actual possessor or occupier of such real
16

See William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the Past: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 111-12
(1996).
17
See Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d at 202.
18
See J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 500, 766 A.2d 1110, 1113 (2001).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1126.
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estate, woodlands or uncultivated tracts, and shall be a good and sufficient
bar to all claims that may be made or actions commenced by any person
whatsoever for the recovery of any such real estate, woodlands or
uncultivated tracts.22
Therefore, the New Jersey court system displayed how confusing the lack
of national uniformity for adverse possession laws can be.23 New Jersey applied
the wrong statute of limitations for the entry of a judgment for adverse possession,
a twenty year period instead of the correct thirty and sixty year period, for over
fifty years before correcting the oversight.24
Municipal land is not always granted immunity from adverse possession.25 In
jurisdictions where municipal land is not immune against adverse possession, there are
limitations as to how the land can be adversely possessed. 26 The first way in which
jurisdictions limit the adverse possession of municipal land is by requiring that the land
be used for public use. 27 Some of these jurisdictions deny adverse possession claims
against municipal land if the municipality can prove that the land will be used for a public
use, such as a school, street, highway or hospital.28 Other jurisdictions put the burden of
proof on the adverse possessor to prove both that the land was not currently being utilized
for public use and that the municipality did not have plans to utilize the land for public

22

See J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 A. 2d at 1113.
Id.
24
Id.
25
See Carl C. Risch, Encouraging the Responsible Use of Land by Municipalities: The Erosion of
Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi and the Use of Adverse Possession Against Municipal Land
Owners, 99 DICK. L. REV. 197, 200 n.24 (1994).
26
Id. at 200-09.
27
Id.
28
Id.
23
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use in the future.29 The second way in which jurisdictions limit the adverse possession of
municipal land is by requiring that the land be held in a proprietary versus a
governmental capacity, attempting to protect the land utilized for governmental
purposes.30
In sum, property owned by the federal government or by state governments is not
subject to adverse possession and most municipalities that are subject to adverse
possession find a way to circumvent adverse possession through amending their statutes
and requirements.31 No developed land owned by the government should be immune to
adverse possession for the reasons listed in Section III.
Section III
Why the Government Should Not Be Immune From Adverse Possession
Allowing adverse possession of developed land owned by the government
incentivizes the government to use land productively and helps to ensure that government
land is put to a valuable use while also ensuring that the developed property throughout
our nation is utilized in a beneficial manner. 32 There are many theories that will be
discussed in this argument that support a general justification of adverse possession of

29

See Risch, supra note 25, at 215.
Id.
31
Id.
32
See SPRANKLING, supra note 3, at 831-33; Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmons, An Economic
Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 161, 164 (1995).
30
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developed government property, mainly the “efficient land use” theory, the “personhood
model,” the Hegelian Theory, and the Locke’s “labor theory”.33
The justification for sovereign immunity of the government “nullum tempus
occurrit regi” has run its course in America.34 This notion should no longer apply to
governmental adverse possession in our nation and should be abandoned as it has in
criminal law, tort law, and contract law. 35 Abolishing the government’s sovereign
immunity against the adverse possession of its land would force the government to either
use and take advantage of the land it possesses or at the very least monitor and maintain
its property.36
It is nearly impossible for United States citizens to know when their government
is acting in a lazy and lackadaisical manner that is hurting the general public.37 Allowing
adverse possession of government property would showcase and highlight the
government’s failure to utilize its land efficiently or to sufficiently monitor its land.38 If
the general public of this nation knew that the government was failing to minimally
monitor its land it would put pressure on the government to utilize its land efficiently.39
As stated, since there is a statute of limitations no shorter than five years for any state and

33

See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2436
(2001); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1987); Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 333 (1988); JOHN LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (J.W. Gough ed., Oxford 1976) (1679).
34
See Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver & Desuetude: Abandonment
& Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 559 (2011).
35
See United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C. Mass. 1821); Developments in the Law:
Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1252 (1950).
36
See SHEPARD, supra note 34, at 559.
37
See e.g. Johnathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 280, 290 (2002).
38
See SHEPARD, supra note 34, at 280.
39
Id.
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as long as 60 years in some states, this monitoring of land by the government would not
be as burdensome or expensive as many fear. 40 In fact, this monitoring would be
relatively cheap and would encourage municipalities, states, and the federal government
to use their land in an advantageous manner for its citizens.41 Government land that is
put to a valuable use has direct benefits to society because it would bring about nature
preserves, post offices, fire departments, schools, and parks.42 This proper utilization of
the land creates a public policy argument in support of the adverse possession of
developed government land.43 The court in Devins v. Borough of Bogota recognized the
benefit of putting pressure on the government to use their property productively through
adverse possession.44 In Devins the Borough of Bogota owned property that the plaintiffappellants had paved and been using as a parking lot for more than the requisite twenty
years needed for the entry of a judgment for adverse possession. 45 The issue in Devins
was whether the land owned by the Borough of Bogota, municipal land, was subject to
adverse possession.46 The court in ruled that municipal land neither dedicated nor used
for a public purpose is subject to acquisition by adverse possession. 47 The court in
Devins stated:
Underlying our belief (that municipally owned land not dedicated or used
for a public purpose should be subject to adverse possession) is the
perception that we are not imposing an undue burden on municipalities by
40

Id.
See Walter Quentin Impert, Whose Land Is It Anyway?: It's Time to Reconsider Sovereign
Immunity from Adverse Possession, 49 UCLA L. REV. 447, 452-453 (2001).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See Devins v. Bogota, 592 A.2d at 203.
45
Id. at 200.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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expecting them to discover within the relevant period of limitations what
property they own and who possesses it. That expectation will encourage
municipalities to make efficient use of their property… Conversely, we
are reluctant to adopt a policy that would encourage municipalities not to
use, dedicate, or even identify their property.48
This demonstrates that the court believed the benefits of the government using its land
productively outweigh the burden of costs associated with allowing the adverse
possession of government property.49
Allowing adverse possession of government property would have many beneficial
economic effects. 50 Forcing property owners, including the government, to utilize or
monitor their land to avoid adverse possession would ensure that property owners could
not be wholly absent. 51 This would make negotiation over the land more likely; and
allowing the land to be adversely possessed would force the property owner to assert her
right to exclude, which could include receiving offers to purchase the land, creating a
market for that land.52 Moreover, adverse possession gives the adverse possessor title to
the property, meaning that the possessor will be free to use the land as she likes. 53
Adverse possession forever bars the original property owner from bringing suit for title
against the adverse possessor, which allows the adverse possessor to avoid any litigation
and be free to sell the property.54 Accordingly, allowing adverse possession of developed

48

See SHEPARD, supra note 34, at 280.
See Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It’s Time to Protect this
Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475, 482-83 (1998).
50
See Thomas Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1122, 1130 (1984).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
49
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government land creates alienability of the land, which in turn creates an economic
market for that land.55
There are also various public policy theories in favor of adverse possession
against the immunity of government land, one of which is the “efficient land use”
theory.56 The “efficient land use” theory is based upon the fact that adverse possession
promotes the efficient use of land.57 The efficient land use theory rewards the trespasser
for putting the land to good use. 58 This justification was more relevant during times
where there was a lot of land across the nation and all states wanted to encourage the
development of the land.59 Although times have changed and land is less abundant there
is still a lot of land that goes unused each year in the United States, much of which is
owned by the government. 60 Furthermore, the efficient land use rationale theory of
adverse possession acts to deter owners from buying large areas of land that they leave
vacant and to punish owners who do not take advantage of their property rights via
development.61 At the very least the efficient land use rationale encourages landowners
to monitor and maintain their property, which could help to keep property in good
condition and preserve land throughout this nation.62

55

See Merrill, supra note 50, at 1154.
See Stake, supra note 33, at 2436
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 539-40 (1996).
60
Id.
61
See William C. Marra, Adverse Possession, Takings, and the State, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
1, 17 (2011).
62
See Stake, supra note 33, at 2436.
56
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Another policy theory in support of adverse possession of developed government
land is the “personhood model.” 63 This theory emphasizes that adverse possessors
typically have a more personal attachment to the land than the actual owner because they
have lived on and utilized the land throughout the entirety of the statute of limitations.64
Due to this attachment the adverse possessor is more likely to use the property for
beneficial purposes and make the most out of the land.65 The true owner has essentially
abandoned the land whereas the adverse possessor has spent the time and effort it is only
appropriate to give the title of that land to the person with the strongest personal
attachment to the land.66 This is no different for government land. When one adversely
trespasses openly and notoriously and has actual and exclusive possession of the property
continuously for the statutory period, they become more attached to that land than the
actual owner, whether that owner happens to be the government or a private citizen.67
The Hegelian Theory, similar to the “efficient land use” theory and the
“personhood model,” emphasizes that there is a relationship between a landowner and her
property.68 This theory stresses that a landowner expresses his freedom and will through
owning his property and occupying the property.69 The theme in this theory is that the
property and the landowner are one entity, that they have a relationship which highlights

63

See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 139 (5th ed. 2002); JOHN P. DWYER &
PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
76 & n.1 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1998); Holmes, supra note 33, at 477; Margaret Jane
Radine, Time, Possession and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 748-49 (1986).
64
See Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 63, at 139.
68
See Hughes, supra note 33, at 333.
69
Id.
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the landowners need to own and occupy property to exercise his free will and the
property needs the landowner to utilize the property.70
Additionally, John Locke’s “labor theory” puts forth that a lands value is based
solely on the labor that goes into that property and therefore he who puts the value into
the land should own the object.71 Locke emphasized the importance of utilizing land and
laboring over the land to truly bring the value out of the land, he stated “tis labour indeed
that puts the difference on value on every thing.”72 Thus, John Locke’s “labor theory”
accentuates that a laborer should gain rights to property when they labor over the
property because they are essentially creating the value of the property.73
The notion of allowing adverse possession of developed government property
across the United States is supported by the “efficient land use” theory, the “personhood
model” theory, the Hegelian theory, and Locke’s “labor theory.”74 A very clear example
that emphasizes all four of these theories took place when New York City failed to
monitor 2,000 of its vacant buildings in the mid-1990s.75 In these vacant buildings there
were some 17,000 individual dwelling units, some had been vacant for decades.76 New
York City not only failed to monitor the vacant buildings that they owned throughout the
city but they failed to even be aware that they owned many of these buildings.77 In many

70

See Hughes, supra note 33, at 333.
See LOCKE, supra note 33.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
LOCKE, supra note 33; See Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77; Hughes, supra note 33 at 333;
Stake, supra note 33, at 2436.
75
See Brian Gardiner, Squatter’s Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for Equitable
Applications of Property Law, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 144 (1997) (reviewing
development of adverse-possession doctrine in Britain).
76
Id.
77
Id.
71
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areas these vacant buildings became the home of many vagrants and eventually also
became home to drug dealers and vandals.78 On the Lower East Side, however, a squatter
community took over many of these buildings and the communities that the squatters
took over “became thriving, freestanding communities of otherwise law-abiding
citizens…. Those squatters often took buildings that were eyesores and public nuisances
at best – and were often dire threats to public safety – and transformed them into clean,
renovated, and functioning housing.”79 This story is so germane because it shows how the
lack of governmental monitoring negatively affect a neighborhood while also exposing
the benefits adverse possession can bring to a similar neighborhood.80
This anecdote displays the theory behind the “efficient land use” theory because
the squatters who took over the buildings on the Lower East Side took decrepit vacant
apartment buildings that were eyesores in their neighborhoods and turned them into
beautiful, well-maintained apartment buildings.81 It further exhibits the theory behind the
“personhood model” because it is apparent that the adverse possessors had more
attachment to the property than the original titleholder did. 82 Moreover, it supports the
Hegelian Theory because it proves that those who occupy property form a bond and a
relationship with the property that allows an individual to express her will and freedom.83

78

See Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public Places, 79 TEMP. L.
REV. 199, 242 (2006) (noting mass abandonment of privately owned buildings in New York City
in the 1970s and 1980s).
79
See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095,
1123-25 (2007) (recounting New York and Philadelphia’s incompetence in dealing with these
properties).
80
See Peñalver & Katyal supra note 79, at 1123-1125.
81
See Duhl, supra note 78, at 242; Peñalver supra note 79, at 1123-1125; Stake, supra note 33, at
2436.
82
See Duhl, supra note 78, at 242; Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77; Peñalver & Katyal supra
note 79, at 1123-1125;
83
See Hughes, supra note 33, at 333.
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Lastly, it supports Locke’s “labor theory” by allowing the squatters who put the labor
into turning abandoned structures into making beautiful buildings in a thriving
neighborhood to live their and enjoy the value of their labor. The adverse possessors, in
this case the squatters, showed their affection and attachment and proved that those who
are more attached to their land are more likely to put their land to beneficial use.84 This
example proves that there is an opportunity for many thriving communities to grow and
flourish across the nation if squatters were able to adversely possess land that the
government has abandoned and forgotten about.
In conclusion, abolishing the government’s sovereign immunity from adverse
possession would result in many beneficial effects on land across the nation. The next
section, Section IV, will discuss the arguments for governmental immunity from adverse
possession and counterarguments of why those arguments fail to prove that governmental
immunity is necessary.
Section IV
Arguments For Governmental Immunity From Adverse Possession
The justifications for the government’s immunity to adverse possession of its land
do not outweigh the benefits. Many of the arguments in favor of sovereign immunity
against adverse possession of government land fail to take into consideration the purpose
and benefits associated with adverse possession. One argument in favor of governmental
immunity is that government property should not be able to be adversely possessed

84

See Duhl, supra note 78, at 242; Peñalver & Katyal supra note 79; supra note 79, at 1123-25;
Holmes, supra note 33, at 476-77.
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because the land is inalienable.85 Not all government land is inalienable, however, and
although there may be limitations on the ability of municipalities to sell the land,
governing bodies and the legislature have the power to convey the land. 86 This argument
further fails to distinguish the difference between governmental property and privately
owned property.87 Privately owned property in certain situations is also inalienable, such
as a situation where a landowner rents the property to a third party with alienability
restrictions, yet there is not adverse possession immunity in these situations.

88

Furthermore, simply because land is inalienable does not mean that the land is being used
productively, the main justification for adverse possession.89
Another justification for governmental immunity against adverse possession is
that the unauthorized use of government property constitutes a nuisance and therefore
adverse possessors of government property should be punished rather than rewarded.
This argument does not take into consideration the fact that the land is being used
beneficially and will likely benefit the community by making use out of land that has
likely been abandoned and unkempt.90 Adverse possession requires that the trespasser’s
possession must be open and notorious, meaning that if their presence was creating a
nuisance or constituted a nuisance, it was not bothering the government nor the
community enough for anyone to acknowledge or complain about their presence. 91
Additionally, even if the use of the land was unlawful, the whole premise behind adverse
85

See Messersmith v. Mayor & Common Council of Riverdale, 164 A.2d 523, 525 (Md. 1960);
Latovick, supra note 49, at 495.
86
See Latovick, supra note 49, at 483-84.
87
See Quentin, supra note 41 at 453.
88
See McClelland v. Miller, 28 OHIO ST. 488, 502 (1876); Latovick, supra note 49, at 484-85
89
See Quentin, supra note 41, at 453.
90
Id.
91
See Mackinac Island Dev. Co., 349 N.W.2d at 195.
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possession is based upon illegality; the use of the land must be adverse.92 If the owner
permitted the possession and use of the land then the possessor cannot adversely possess
and the doctrine of adverse possession would not exist, thus the nuisance argument
fails.93
Others believe that government land bought for the purpose of investment should
not be allowed to be adversely possessed because the government buys that land to let it
remain untouched and gain value. 94 The government typically buys land outside of
upcoming cities or areas where the government foresees eventual growth in order to
eventually develop or sell the land.95 In this situation the government has the same duty
as a private developer would to monitor their property and deter any adverse possessors.96
Monitoring land bought for investment and development does not require constant
monitoring or even monthly monitoring because adverse possession must be continuous
and the statute of limitations for adverse possession typically runs over a few years.97 In
fact, with new technology the cost of monitoring land has plummeted over the last few
decades. 98

The government can now monitor land in an economical manner via

photograph, video, or through satellite use if necessary. 99

The threat of adverse

possession would also incentivize the government to develop and use its land within a
reasonable time after purchasing the property, not neglecting or failing to utilize this

92

See Mackinac Island Dev. Co., 349 N.W.2d at 195.
Id.
94
See Howard Gensler, Property Law as an Optimal Economic Foundation, 35 WASHBURN L.J.
50, 55-56 (1995).
95
Id. at 55.
96
Id. at 32-43.
97
See Quentin, supra note 41, at 459.
98
See Stake, supra note 33, at 2422.
99
Id.
93
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country’s scarce land and resources.100 This is not to say that the undeveloped land in
this nation must be utilized, in fact, it will be argued below that there must be
environmental protection of undeveloped land.101 In sum, there would be little to no cost
involved in the government checking on their investment land every so often to ensure
that there is no threat of adverse possession so there is no reason why the government
should be treated any different than a developer in terms of adverse possession of land
bought for investment.102
Many argue that the costs that would be associated with allowing governmental
adverse possession warrant the immunity afforded to the government’s property. When
someone loses property due to adverse possession they do not receive compensation for
the value of their land.103 This could seemingly be a problem for the government if it
were to lose large amounts of land without receiving compensation.104 The problem with
this argument is that the government does receive a compensation of sorts once the land
is adversely possessed because the adverse possessor must pay the taxes associated with
owning land.105 Although the compensation from taxation is minimal, the government
does not collect any taxes when long-term trespassers enjoy the exclusive use of
government property without paying taxes on the land, essentially receiving the benefits
of land ownership without paying taxes to the government.106 The land that is typically
adversely possessed is land that the government does not use and has not monitored
100

See Gensler, supra note 94, at 32-43.
See Sprankling, supra note 59, at 573.
102
Id.
103
See Latovick, supra note 49, at 488
104
Id.
105
See Raul Hernandez, Officials Consider Selling City Properties, VENTURA COUNTY STAR,
Sept. 26, 2000, at B1.
106
Id.
101
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throughout the statute of limitations so it is safe to assume that the government did not
greatly value the land and was not receiving benefits from owning it.107 Although the
property taxes are less than if the government had sold the property, the benefit they
receive outweighs the benefit of allowing trespassers to use the property without granting
any benefit to the government. 108

Furthermore, this could put pressure on the

government to sell more of their land before it could be adversely possessed, which
would give money back to the government and allow for the beneficial use of more
land.109 In conclusion, when land is adversely possessed the government receives land
taxes paid by the adverse possessor, a benefit that the government does not receive when
long-term trespassers use government property.
There are also property theories that support sovereign immunity of government
property from adverse possession.

The Hegelian theory of property suggests that

property is an expression of the self and that property rights are important to keep
property owners from constant conflict over their property in order to protect their selfactualization.110 The Hegelian Theory implies that property is an expression of will and
part of the landowner’s personality and that if the property is secure then the owner is
free to pursue freedom and develop a stronger personality and will.111 This theory looks
to protect the relationship between a landowner and her property but also emphasizes that
the relationship is fluid and that because a landowner must express the will to possess the
land someone who fails to do so can “lose possession of property through
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prescription.”112 On one hand the Hegelian Theory protects the rights of the original
landowner, but on the other hand it stresses that an individual must occupy the land
through “physically seizing it, imposing a form upon it, and marking it.” This theory
expresses that marking property is similar to using property in that it expresses an
individual’s will to utilize and enjoy the property.113 Thus, although the Hegelian Theory
emphasizes the importance of the freedom a landowner achieves in owning property, the
importance of a landowner’s property rights, and the importance of a landowners
relationship with the property as an expression of will, it still stresses the need for
someone who fails to use property to lose possession of that property through
prescription. 114 Therefore, the Hegelian Theory would seem to support the need for
adverse possession against developed government property that is not utilized or
maintained.115
There is also an argument to be made that sovereign immunity of government
land from adverse possession is necessary to protect the wild and undeveloped land in the
United States.116 This argument is not disputed and in fact should be taken even further
to the point where all wild and undeveloped land must be more difficult to adversely
possess than it currently is.117 This will be argued further below.
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Section V
The Need to Protect Wild and Undeveloped Land
The strongest justification for governmental immunity from adverse possession is
that much of government property is held in an environmental capacity.118 Many believe
that the concern for protecting the environment outweighs the desire to maximize the
productive use of land.119 Although an adverse possessor uses vacant land productively,
making the most out of land, land in its natural state is scarce and adverse possession of
this land would diminish the amount of natural land.120 There are many undeveloped
areas that the government leaves in its natural state such as state parks, state forests,
green belts, national parks and forests, and many nature preserves.121 Adverse possession
must balance efficient land use with environmental concerns, and when one or the other
leans too heavily against the other it is the role of the legislature and government to
remedy this concern.122 Protecting those undeveloped areas does not go far enough, there
must be stricter regulations when it comes to the requirements needed to adversely
possess natural and undeveloped lands.123
It is seen as a goal of many that undeveloped land in this nation must be protected
through sovereign immunity to ensure that the scarce natural land remains intact and well
preserved. 124 The problem is that it is much easier to adversely possess undeveloped
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lands than it is to adversely possess commercial, residential, or agricultural land.125 In
the nineteenth century the country was attempting to develop as much land as possible for
economic purposes and therefore did not value forests, deserts, wetlands, swamps, and
other undeveloped lands, something Sprankling termed the “development model.” 126
This lack of economic value based on natural land led to more lenient requirements
needed to adversely possess undeveloped land. 127 Judges have awarded undeveloped
land via adverse possession for possessors who have simply engaged in harvesting hay;
gathering firewood; seasonal stock grazing; occasional cattle grazing; removal of leaf
mold; limited clear cutting; picnicking; limited timber cutting; marking boundaries;
erecting a fence; clearing roads; and hunting and hiking. 128 Theorists have justified
adverse possession of this undeveloped land because it is impossible to build houses or
farm on the land so it is impossible to improve the land in a beneficial manner. 129
Furthermore, due to the inaccessibility of many wild lands courts refuse to enforce the
open and notorious aspect and constructive and actual knowledge aspect normally
required for adverse possession. 130 The attempt to allow those who will utilize the
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property to claim title to the property through adverse possession has led to too lenient
requirements to adversely possess undeveloped land.131
The relaxed standards needed for the adverse possession of undeveloped land are
problematic for many reasons. Professor John G. Sprankling described the “development
model” and “anti-wilderness bias” that led to easier adverse possession of undeveloped
land as anti-environmental and stated that it should not longer have a place in today’s
world where we should be placing higher value on conserving our natural and
undeveloped land.132 When asked in survey research Americans stated that they believed
there should be stronger efforts made by our government to protect our natural land and
that it is everyone’s obligation to do so and that everyone should have access to outdoor
recreation areas. 133

Furthermore, Americans believed that more land should be

designated for protection of historical landscapes, national parks, and for rare and
endangered species. 134 In 2001 state and local ballot proposals displayed that voters
wanted more natural land as 137 out of 196 proposals promoting natural were approved
resulting in funding for $1.7 million for natural land conservation and parks. 135 This
desire to preserve and conserve land is contrary to the current leniency allowed to adverse
possessors of undeveloped land and highlights why courts must refine the adverse
possession requirements necessary to adversely possess this undeveloped land.136
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Although there have been many conservation easements agreed to recently that
protect millions of acres of wild lands and undeveloped land there are still millions of
acres of wild lands that are not protected by conservation easements.137 These easements
protect wild and undeveloped land by granting a deed or conservation that guarantees the
rights of the grantee to “protect natural, scenic, historic, agricultural, forest, or open space
values” and prohibits uses including “subdivision and development, commercial uses,
alteration of land surface, mineral development, timber harvesting, signs, utility lines, or
interference with natural resources such as wetlands, ponds, streams, wildlife, and
wildlife habit.”138 The land not protected by such easements is still susceptible to adverse
possession. Some courts have found creative ways to protect undeveloped land and more
courts must adhere to these methods and find a way to protect and conserve this land.139
These courts have found that use of undeveloped land is permissive and thus not adverse,
that improvements and developments on wild lands is not open or notorious, and that the
owners can not detect or prevent those using undeveloped land and thus it is deemed
permissive.140 These courts, still in the minority in terms of state law, impose a higher
standard rather than a lower standard in order to adversely possess wild and undeveloped
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land.141 This raised standard or simply just not a lowered standard of adverse possession
could go a long way in limiting the amount of undeveloped and natural land that is
developed and protect a scarce resource in this nation.
Section VI
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to discuss the fact that government’s
developed land should not be afforded sovereign immunity from adverse possession and
that all undeveloped land should require the same elements as adverse possession of
developed land in order to preserve and conserve as much natural property and wild lands
as possible.

As discussed in detail, there are many policy reasons for abolishing

sovereign immunity from adverse possession for the government’s developed land. The
positive effects adverse possession has on private citizens could be equally as beneficial
when applied to government land, it would promote the beneficial use of land while
deterring property owners from letting their land stay vacant and idle. Additionally,
undeveloped property and wild lands must be preserved as it becomes scarcer in
America. As stated in this argument, adverse possession requirements are actually less
strict for adverse possession of undeveloped land than they are for developed land and in
order to preserve and conserve undeveloped land across the nation the adverse possession
requirements must be the same for undeveloped land as it is for developed property. The
developed land in the United States must be used in the most beneficial manner possible
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and the undeveloped land must be preserved and conserved, both of which can be
accomplished by changing the rules of adverse possession.
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